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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE BY BUGGED
AGENTS - Is ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE BY BUGGED AGENTS A
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Koran v. United States (5th Cir. 1969)
United States v. White (7th Cir. 1969)
Two recent federal circuit court decisions based on strikingly similar
fact situations reflect conflicting positions on whether electronic surveil-
lance by bugged agents1 is a search and seizure within the fourth amend-
ment. In Koran v. United States2 the defendant was convicted of counter-
feiting through the testimony of a government agent who, without a
warrant, listened to a conversation between the defendant and an informer
which was being transmitted from a device concealed on the latter's person.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
conviction, holding that Katz v. United Statess was not applicable to
bugged agents, and that the evidence so obtained was not a search and
seizure within the fourth amendment. In United States v. White,4 the
trial court had convicted the defendant of violating the federal narcotics
laws 5 based on testimony given by government agents, who, lacking a
warrant, overheard various conversations between the defendant and an
agent who had concealed a transmitter on his person. Even though the
conversations took place within the defendant's home, automobile, place
of business and the informer's home, the trial court held that their procure-
ment was not a search and seizure. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed, however, holding that under the rationale of Katz sur-
veillance by means of a bugged agent was a search and seizure which,
1. The term bugged agent refers to electronic surveillance with the aid of a
party who is participating in the conversation and includes either recording or trans-
mitting by that party. The term non-participatory electronic surveillance refers to any
electronic surveillance without the aid of a participant to the conversation. While
wiretapping usually falls into the latter category, it has been treated as a separate
problem. See generally Chorney, Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, 7 CRIM.
L.Q. 434 (1965). For a thorough discussion of all the areas of electronic surveillance
and for a good bibliography, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS VOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE (Tent. Draft, 1968).
2. 408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit in a per curiam opinion
in United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969), and the Tenth Circuit in
Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1968), have ruled the same way as
the Fifth Circuit, using similar reasoning.
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) (1964) ; 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
when undertaken without a warrant, was unreasonable and therefore in
violation of the fourth amendment. Koran v. United States, 408 F.2d 1321
(5th Cir. 1969). United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
Search and seizure cases involving the use of electronic surveillance
equipment by government agents have been before the Supreme Court in
a number of instances.6 In its initial decision in this area, Olmstead v.
United States,7 the Court held that evidence obtained by wiretapping was
not the product of a search and seizure under the fourth amendment8
since there could be no search without a physical trespass, 9 and no seizure
where "intangibles" such as words were taken.' 0 In On Lee v. United
States," the Supreme Court, applying the Olmstead reasoning to evidence
secured by bugged agents, held that since neither the concealment of a
transmitter on an informer nor his entry into the defendant's premises by
false pretenses constituted a trespass, there could be no search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.12 In 1963, in Lopez v.
United States,'8 the Court after initially following the rationale enunciated
in Olmstead and On Lee, added a new dimension to the electronic sur-
veillance area by announcing that bugged agent surveillance should not
be considered eavesdropping since the government was not listening to
conversations it could not otherwise have heard, and by introducing the
recording it was merely using the best evidence available. The Court
further reasoned that the defendant could not complain about the recorda-
tion since it was part of the risk he undertook when he conversed with
another person.'
4
In the most recent bugged agent case considered by the Supreme
Court, Osborn v. United States,'5 the Court sanctioned a bugged agent
6. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 343 (1967) ; Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) ; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) ; Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) ; Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480(1958) ; Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) ; On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), an electronic surveillance
case, the Court applied the rule enunciated in Olmstead. Both cases were later over-
ruled by Katz. For background constitutional history in electronic surveillance see,
Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious
Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. Rlv.
190, 191-202 (1968) ; King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some
Recent Developments and Observations, 33 Gzo. WASH. L. Rnv. 240 (1964); Com-
ment, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment
Framework, 50 MINN. L. Rev. 378, 384 (1965).
9. The requirement of a physical trespass was repudiated in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
10. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court held that
intangibles, i.e., the defendant's own words, were capable of being seized.
11. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
12. Id. at 751-52.
13. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
14. Id. at 439. The Lopez Court cited to Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S.
107 (1957), a wiretapping case, in analogizing the assumption of risk in having words
transmitted or recorded by a confidant to the risk of being overheard in a telephone
conversation. Id.
15. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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surveillance which was made persuant to a search warrant rather than
merely denying certiorari on the grounds that Lopez was controlling. By
referring to the use of a warrant as a "procedure of antecedent justifica-
tion before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment as a
precondition to lawful electronic surveillance," 1 6 the Court fell within
both the broad ruling of the majority in Lopez and the narrower view of
Mr. Justice Brennen's dissent, which strongly advocated that at the very
minimum a search warrant should be required before any surveillance
takes place.'T While the Osborn Court did not rule that a bugged agent
surveillance was a search and seizure requiring a warrant, the opinion
tends to undermine the position the majority had previously taken in Lopez.
In the recent electronic surveillance case before the Supreme Court,
Katz v. United States,'8 involving non-participatory surveillance, 19 two
issues were presented: (1) whether a non-participatory electronic surveil-
lance was a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment; and (2) if so, whether a search conducted without a warrant was
unreasonable. At the outset, the Katz Court rejected the trespass theory,
thereby overruling Olmstead, and established a new test for determining
whether electronic surveillance is a search and seizure. 20 Mr. Justice
Stewart, speaking for the majority, stated that
[T]he underpinnnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded
by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunci-
ated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.21
With respect to the second issue the Court concluded that the procure-
ment of a search warrant, which provides for antecedent justification before
a neutral magistrate, was a "constitutional precondition of the kind of
electronic surveillance involved in this case."'22
In the instant cases the specific issue before both courts was the effect
of the Katz decision on bugged agent surveillance. In Koran v. United
States23 the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that Katz
established new guidelines which prohibited bugged agent surveillance
16. Id. at 330.
17. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963).
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For general discussions of the Katz case, see Greena-
walt, supra note 4; 13 VILL. L. Rev. 643 (1968).
19. See note 1 supra.
20. 389 U.S. at 353.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 359.
23. 408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969). The Koran case was not a case of first
impression in the Fifth Circuit. The court relied on Dryden v. United States, 391
F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir.
1968) ; Hansford v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1968), (per curiam), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968) ; Long v. United States, 387 F.2d 377, 378 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1967).
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without a warrant and held that bugged agent cases were an entirely
distinct legal problem. 24 The "crucial" distinguishing factor was phrased
in terms of assumption of risk. The court reasoned that in a bugged agent
situation the defendant assumes the risk that his conversant will expose
his statements, whereas in Katz, since the recording was made without
the aid of one of the conversants, the subsequent exposure resulted from
a risk which had not been assumed by the defendant. 25  Therefore, the
Koran court concluded that On Lee, Lopez, and Osborn were left undis-
turbed by Katz and constituted the "established law" which controlled the
decision.2 6 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in White v. United
States found that "for all conceptual purposes" the situations in Katz
and White were the same, and the factual distinction suggested by the
government based on the consent of a conversant was without legal signifi-
cance.27 The court reasoned that both cases involved a bugging technique
through which the "uninvited ear" invaded the privacy of the conversation
without the consent of the respective speakers.28
The basic point of disagreement between the two courts is the extent
of the risk which the speaker assumes when conversing with another
person. The Koran court held the risk extended to any means which one
conversant chose to use in exposing his conversation with the other.2 9
Conversely, the White court held that the risk undertaken in conversing
with another was merely that the listener would memorize and repeat the
content of their conversation, and not that the listener would allow third
parties to overhear them.80
24. 408 F.2d at 1323.
25. Id. at 1323-24.
26. While the Fifth Circuit in Koran did not state what the "established law"
was, it cited to a number of prior cases dealing with the bugged agent question. See
note 23 supra. In Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968), a post-Katz
decision, the court held On Lee, Lopez and Osborn to be the controlling law. The
Fifth Circuit's reliance on these cases appears erroneous, since in Katz, the Court,
by expressly repudiating the trespass doctrine as enunciated by Olmstead, sub silencio
overruled On Lee and Lopez to the extent they relied on trespass. Only the Lopez
alternative argument - that the government was not listening to conversations it
could not otherwise have heard - is still authoritative; however, the recent judicial
trend has been to abandon that argument in favor of the reasoning announced in
Justice Brennen's dissent in Lopez. 373 U.S. at 446-71. The only unscathed "estab-
lished law" applicable to bugged agent surveillance is Osborn, which further under-
mined Lopez by approving of the use of a warrant and consequently left the law
applicable to bugged agents in a state of uncertainty. However, Osborn is sufficient
ground upon which the Fifth Circuit could have based its conclusion once it had
determined that Katz is inapplicable to bugged agents.
27. 405 F.2d at 843. The Seventh Circuit's decision in the instant case constitutes
a reversal of the position it had taken in United States v. Haden, 397 F.2d 460, 465
(7th Cir. 1968), where it was decided that "Lopez was in no way undermined by
Katz . . ." since Katz did not involve a "misplaced confidence." 397 F.2d at 465.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed its position in the instant case in United States v.
Waller, _ F.2d - (7th Cir. 1969), where it reversed a conviction based on evidence
obtained by a bugged agent who acted without a warrant. This affirmation took place
after both the Second Circuit, supra note 2, and the Fifth Circuit had expressly
repudiated the court's decision in the instant case.
28. 405 F.2d at 843.
29. 408 F.2d at 1323-24.
30. 405 F.2d at 845.
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The Fifth Circuit found support for its position in Justice White's
concurring opinion in Katz,31 where it was stated that Katz left the law
of bugged agent surveillance undisturbed.3 2 He considered bugged agent
surveillance closely analogous to the situation in Hoffa v. United States,33
where the conversant merely testified about an incriminating conversation
he had had with the defendant. Thus, Justice White held Hoffa to stand
for the proposition that "when one man speaks to another he takes all the
risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to
whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. '3 4 From this, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the recording or transmitting of a conversa-
tion is a "logical and reasonable extention" of Hoffa and is part of the risk
one assumes when confiding in another person.3 5
The Seventh Circuit, while recognizing the validity of the Hoffa de-
cision, found it inapplicable to electronic surveillance. 86 It agreed with
the government's contention that the defendant had assumed the risk that
his confidence in another person might be misplaced and that the con-
versant might memorize and repeat what was said, but found, however,
that the use of a transmitter by the conversant was not within the risk
assumed and consequently violated the privacy to which a party to a con-
versation is entitled. Therefore, the court decided that the Katz test should
be used in determining the legality of the search and seizure at issue.37
In applying the Katz test, the court examined the facts to determine
if the defendant was, under the circumstances, justified in relying on his
privacy in conducting the conversation. 8 This inquiry necessitated the
examination of two separate elements: first, whether the defendant's activity
was directed at keeping his statements private; and secondly, whether the
defendant should have reasonably anticipated this type of surveillance.3 9
With respect to the first, the court indicated that the mere use of a bugged
agent to obtain evidence of the conversation is prima facie proof of the
defendant's efforts to keep it private.4 0  Secondly, the court determined
that the surveillance did not result from a risk which the defendant should
have justifiably anticipated,41 because "[the defendant] surely is entitled
to assume that the words he utters ... will not be broadcast to the world." 42
Thus the government's failure to procure a search warrant as required by
Katz resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure.43
31. 389 U.S. at 362-64.
32. Id. at 363 n.1.
33. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 n.1 (1967).
35. 408 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (1969).
36. 405 F.2d at 846.
37. Id. at 843.
38. Id. at 846.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), quoted in United States v.
White, 405 F.2d 838, 846 n.12 (1969).
43. The White court dismissed the government's claim that the defendant had
waived his fourth amendment rights by ruling that the defendant had no knowledge
[VOL. 14
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An analysis of the conflicting positions of the two circuit courts indi-
cates that the Seventh Circuit's decision in White is more in line with the
underlying rationale of Katz. The conclusion of the White court is sup-
ported by the basic tenor of the Katz opinion, which requires all electronic
surveillance to meet a test of reasonableness. 44 Katz was concerned with
the preservation of the individual's privacy and liberty, and found these
rights to be jeopardized by the unrestricted use of electronic devices. This
danger is equally as apparent in bugged agent surveillance. The Seventh
Circuit recognized this when it referred to the Katz Court's affirmative
reference to Osborn as an illustration of the ideal means of undertaking
bugged agent surveillance, i.e., by first obtaining a warrant.4 5
Going beyond the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit but in support of
their conclusion is the fact that the Katz Court affirmatively cited to Justice
Brennen's dissent in Lopez, 46 where he expressed concern for the expand-
ing use of electronic surveillance and noted the dire consequences it held
for the basic constitutional rights of the individual.4 7 Although Justice
Brennen preferred a total prohibition of the use of such devices, he im-
pliedly conceded to their use where a warrant is first obtained.4 8
In addition to implications drawn from Katz, there is a strong prac-
tical argument which supports the Seventh Circuit's position. The require-
ment of antecedent justification through a warrant,49 if the prerequisites
for obtaining a warrant are no more stringent than those approved in
Osborn, will reduce the inherent dangers of electronic surveillance °
of the electronic surveillance and therefore he did not have the ability to waive his
rights. 405 F.2d at 844, 848.
While the Seventh Circuit appears to have obtained a satisfactory solution
to the bugged agent problem, there is one troubling inconsistency in its opinion. Instead
of rejecting the Lopez decision, which is logically inconsistent with the opinion in
White, the court attempted to distinguish it on the basis of due process. The dis-
tinction was based on the fact that in Lopez the bugged agent testified against the
defendant, thereby offering an opportunity for cross-examination, whereas in White
he failed to so testify. 405 F.2d at 847. This distinction, however, is immaterial to
the determination of whether there was a search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment, and therefore the court should have totally repudiated the result obtained
in Lopez. See Justice Brennen's dissent in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
451 (1963).
This due process argument was also used by Chief Justice Warren in his
concurring opinion in Lopez where he compared the conduct of the prosecution during
trial in Lopez with that of the prosecution in On Lee. 373 U.S. 427, 441-46 (1963).
44. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
45. 405 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1969).
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 n.17 (1967).
47. 373 U.S. at 466-71. In distinguishing the risk of an associate's memorization
and repetition of a conversation from the risk of his recordation or transmission of
the conversation as spoken, Justice Brennen stated that "[t]here is no security from
that kind of eavesdropping [bugged agents], no way of mitigating the risk, and so not
even a residuum of true privacy." Id. at 466. Justices Douglas and Goldberg joined
Justice Brennen in his dissent in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 446-71 (1963).
Chief Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion in Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963),
and Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Osborn, 385 U.S. 223, 329 n.7 (1966),
have expressed at least a limited approval of Justice Brennen's view.
48. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963).
49. The warrant has been deemed the best means of balancing the opposing in-
terests of the individual's rights and the needs of law enforcement. See Greenawalt,
supra note 8, at 231.
50. Electronic surveillance has been criticized as being unhealthy for society and
degrading for government. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952)
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without inhibiting the effective use of the bugged agent as a weapon of
law enforcement. 51
The diverse views expressed by the White and Koran courts are both
tenable interpretations of the impact of the Katz decision on the law
governing electronic surveillance. The cause for the conflict between the
circuits is that the Supreme Court in Katz, while applying a generalized
concept of privacy to electronic surveillance, spoke only in terms of non-
participatory electronic surveillance, thereby causing ambiguity to arise
in the bugged agent situation. Hopefully the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari to resolve this ambiguity, and in its review will look favorably
upon the view expressed by the Seventh Circuit that bugged agent sur-
veillance is a search and seizure within the fourth amendment.5 2
Richard W. Hollstein
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION - CONFLICT OF LAWS - CHOICE
OF LAW CLAUSE - CHOICE OF NEW YORK LAW CLAUSE IN PROMIS-
SORY NOTE INSUFFICIENT UNDER CPLR 302 To GIVE NEW YORK
COURT IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DOMICILIARY.
Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Krakow (D.D.C. 1969)
Plaintiff, a New York bank, brought the original action in the Supreme
Court of New York, Nassau County, against defendants, executors of the
estate of Charles Rose, a District of Columbia domiciliary, for breach of a
$100,000 promissory note negotiated and executed in the District of
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Such surveillance has also been criticized as a serious threat
to an individual's liberty by interfering with his right to privacy. See Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, it has been
stated that electronic surveillance acts as a coercive restriction on freedom of speech
by prohibiting the candid expression of ideas. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally A. Westin, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967); Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 214-21; 40 ST. JOHN'S L. liv. 59
(1965).
51. For comment on the effective use of electronic surveillance to obtain convic-
tions, see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) ; THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: CRIME AND I'S IMPACT - AN AsSESSMENT' (1967); Greenawalt, supra
note 8, at 212-14.
52. Justice Black holds another view on this question as expressed by his dissent
in Katz. He has steadfastly concluded that Olnstead is the proper approach and that
the fourth amendment refers only to the searching and seizing of "tangibles," and that
since voice vibrations are intangible the fourth amendment has no application. He
refuses to "distort" the meaning of the fourth amendment by updating it to include
such protection of an individual's privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373(1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 14
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Columbia. Repayment was to be made by the mailing of payments from
the District of Columbia to New York. The note further provided that
it was to be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of New
York. The New York court, utilizing the "transaction of business" pro-
vision of the New York "long-arm" statute1 to acquire in personam juris-
diction over the defendants, entered a default judgment against the estate
in the amount of $122,792, interest and attorney's fees included. Plaintiff
then brought the instant suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to enforce the default judgment, and moved, pursuant
to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a judgment
on the pleadings.2 The defendants answered the motion by alleging that
the New York court lacked jurisdiction to render the default judgment
against the estate. The district court denied plaintiff's motion, holding that
the defendant had alleged sufficient facts which, if proven, would result in
a New York court, interpreting the New York "long-arm" statute, finding
that the decedent did not have sufficient contacts with that state to give
its courts in personam jurisdiction and therefore the court in the instant
suit is not required to give full faith and credit 3 to the New York judg-
ment. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Krakow, _. F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1969).
The traditional bases of in personam jurisdiction was the individual's
presence within the forum state or his consent to such jurisdiction.4 In
1877, the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff5 raised these bases to con-
stitutional stature by adjudging them to be the sole criteria for satisfaction
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 Later, domicile
was likewise held to occupy constitutional stature as a basis for in per-
sonam jurisdiction.7 However, it became increasingly apparent that strict
adherence to these traditional bases of jurisdiction was not readily com-
patible with the increased nationalization of commerce.8 Moreover, the
technological advances in communications and transportation made the
defense of a suit in a foreign state far less burdensome.9 After first attempt-
ing to broaden the states' scope of jurisdiction through the creation of
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Court noted, however, that the proper motion
in this instance should have been a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56
since "matters outside the pleadings" were presented.
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945) Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper,
Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1921); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107(1890) Operative Plasters' & Cement Finishers' Int'l Ass'n v. Case, 93 F.2d 56
(D.C. Cir. 1937).
4. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 1961).
See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136-37 (1966) ; Comment, Developments in the Law - State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 916-18 (1960).
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6. Id. at 732-34.
7. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90, 92 (1917).
8. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). See Developments in the Law,
supra note 4, at 917.
9.. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
SUMMER 1969]
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss4/12
766 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14
various exceptions such as "implied consent"' 0 or "doing business,"" the
Supreme Court, in International Shoe v. Washington,12 rejected the con-
cepts of presence and consent as "legal fiction"13 and enunciated a flexible
guideline for determining whether due process standards had been met.
This guideline requires only that the defendant have had "certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "14
In response to the flexible rule of jurisdiction announced in Inter-
national Shoe, a number of state legislatures,", including New York,16
enacted single-act statutes designed to do away with the "legal fictions"
of consent and presence as the exclusive tests of jurisdiction. 17 The New
York statute, section 302 of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR),
10. E.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
11. E.g., International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See Cahill,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry On Business
Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. Rev. 676 (1917) ; Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 24 MicH. L. Riv. 633 (1926) ; Gavin, Doing Business as Applied to
Foreign Corporations, 11 TpMP. L.Q. 46 (1936) ; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Busi-
ness, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1925) ; Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corpora-
tions Based on a Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342(1958); Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 919-23; Note, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations - An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Id. at 318.
14. Id. at 316, quoting in part, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
15. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 704 (1964) ; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1963), as
amended (McKinney Supp. 1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962). See
Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. REv. 336 (1963) ; Auer-
bach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. Riv. 13 (1966) ; Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963
U. ILL. L. FOR. 533 (1963) ; Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to
Render Judgments Against Foreign Corporations and Nonresident Individuals, 31
S. CAL. L. R v. 339 (1958) ; Jacobson, The Enlargement of Jurisdiction Over
Unlicensed Foreign Corporations in Missouri - The "Single-Act Statute," 31 U. KAN.
CITY L. REv. 292 (1963) ; Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17, at 163 (Smith-Hurd 1968); O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Con-
cepts of State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act,
31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 223 (1956) ; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing
Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249 (1959) ; Thode,
In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031B, The Texas "Long Arm" Statute; And the
Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 279(1964) ; Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents and Montana's New Rule 4B,
24 MONT. L. REv. 3 (1962) ; Note, Some Problems Under Iowa's Judicial Jurisdic-
tion Statutes, 48 IOWA L. Rv. 968 (1963) ; Comment, Expanded in Personam Juris-
diction - Due Process and the Tennessee Long Arm Statute, 33 TENN. L. REv. 371
(1966); Comment, The Isolated Contract as a Basis of Jurisdiction Over Nonresi-
dents, 22 U. CHL L. Rvv. 674 (1955) ; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents -
The Washington "Long Arm" Statute, 38 WASH. L. REv. 560 (1963) ; Legislation,
Jurisdiction Under New Ohio "Long Arm" Statute - Problems of Interpretation
and Application, 35 U. CIN. L. Rv. 157 (1966) ; Note, The Virginia "Long Arm"
Statute, 51 VA. L. Rv. 719 (1965) ; Note, Expanded Bases of Jurisdiction - An
Examination of Tennessee's New "Long Arm" Statute, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1484 (1965).
16. See Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO L. Rv. 61 (1965) ; Comment, Transacting Business as Juris-
dictional Basis - A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 525 (1965).
Also see McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW§ 302, at 428-29 (McKinney 1963).
17. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
452, 454 & n.4, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14, 16 & n.4, 209 N.E.2d 68, 72, 73 & n.4 (1965)
Notes 15 & 16 supra.
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specifically provides, inter alia, that New York courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over "any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator [who] ...
transacts any business within the state .... 18
The overall issue presented by the instant case is the effect that a
valid choice of law clause will have on a determination of jurisdiction
under the constitutional limitations of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.19 The narrower issue, and the one on which the
Krakow court focused, is whether the choice of New York law proviso
was a sufficient contact with New York to allow that state to assert in
personam jurisdiction over the District of Columbia domiciliaries under
the "transaction of business" clause of CPLR 302.20
There would appear to be no doubt that the choice of New York law
clause in the promissory note is valid. In order for such a provision to
effectively instruct the trying forum as to which law should apply, it must
bear some reasonable relationship either to the parties or to the transac-
tion itself.21 It is well-established that when the state chosen is where
"performance by one of the parties is to take place or where one of the
parties is domiciled or has his principal place of business," 22 the selection
of that state's laws as controlling will be held to be reasonable. Since
plaintiff is a New York bank and performance, i.e., repayment, was to
take place in New York, the choice of New York law in the instant case
is valid and will be deemed to control.
Once the validity of the choice of law clause is established, the inquiry
becomes jurisdictional in nature. The classic case defining the limits of
the New York "long-arm" statute is Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,23 where the New York Court of Appeals, in
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, looked
to the totality of the defendant's voluntary activities within the state in
holding that the defendant had engaged in "purposeful acts" in New York
18. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
19. See pp. 768-70 infra.
20. The court also considered the issue of whether the requirement in the note
that payment was to be made in New York constituted sufficient contact under CPLR
302 to allow New York to assert in personam jurisdiction, but found that under New
York decisions this contact, in and of itself, was insufficient to invoke jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Bankers Commercial Corp. v. Alto, Inc., 30 App. Div. 2d 517, 289 N.Y.S.2d
993 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; Wirth v. Prenyl, 29 App. Div. 2d 373, 288 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); Hubbard, Westervelt & Mottlelay, Inc. v. Harsh Building Co., 28 App.
Div. 2d 295, 284 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1967). But see G. Benedict Corp. v. Epstein,
47 Misc. 2d 316, 262 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Cf. Goldman v. Goldman, 48
Misc. 2d 985, 266 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Civ. Ct. Rec. 1966).
21. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (Prop. Off. Draft,
Pt. II, 1967) provides, inter alia, that
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied . . . unless ...
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice ...
22. RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT or LAWS § 187, comment f at 191
(Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II, 1967). See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse, 274 U.S.
403, 408 (1928) ; Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929),
af'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930) ; Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30,
150 N.W. 229 (1914).
23. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
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which invoked the "benefits and protections" of New York law.2 4 The
activities which the court deemed purposeful consisted of the negotiation
and execution of a supplemental agreement in New York, the shipment
of defective machines to New York, and the installation and testing of such
machines by defendant's employees in plaintiff's New York plant. The
parties had also intentionally included a clause stating that the contract
had been executed in New York (which it had not) and that it was to
be governed and construed in accordance with New York law. Although
it could be argued that such a clause constituted "purposeful activity" in
New York sufficient to invoke "the benefits and protections" of New York
law,25 the court of appeals merely footnoted the issue. Judge Fuld stated:
We do no more than note the added fact that the contract itself
expressed the agreement of the parties that it was to be regarded as
having been made in New York and as governed by New York law.26
This cursory treatment of the expressed intention of the parties seems to
indicate that New York courts will give little, if any, independent weight
to a choice of law clause in determining whether a defendant has "trans-
acted any business" under CPLR 302. Rather, such treatment serves to
emphasize that by "purposeful activities" the New York courts are going
to insist on actual conduct within the state rather than activity which could
be termed legal conduct.2 7
Thus, since it would not appear that a choice of law clause constitutes
sufficient contact under New York law for that state to invoke in personam
jurisdiction, the District of Columbia court was correct in deciding that
the New York default judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit.
However, it must be kept in mind that the limits which the New York
courts place on their assertion of in personam jurisdiction under CPLR
302 are not necessarily coextensive with the outer limits of the due process
clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.28 Therefore, the question still
remains as to what effect a valid choice of law clause will have on a state's
assertion of in personam jurisdiction where it is limited only by the due
process clause.
24. Id. at 457-58, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19, 209 N.E.2d 75-76, quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 457 n.6, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19 n.6, 209 N.E.2d at 76 n.6 (emphasis added).
27. See Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 17 SYRACUS L. Rtv. 139, 140 n.4 (1966);
McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 118.
28. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 108; Weinstein, Korn & Miller, Niw
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ff 302.01, at 3-29, 3-30 (1968). There is some disagreement
among the New York courts as to whether CPLR 302 was intended by the legisla-
ture to occupy the entire field of jurisdiction under modern constitutional doctrine.
Compare Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1964);
Lewis v. American Archives Ass'n, 43 Misc. 2d 721, 723, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 219 (Sup.
Ct. 1964) ; Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 601, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49,
51 (Sup. Ct. 1964), with A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda.. 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329,
266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70,
247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See Comment, supra note 16, at 538-39. How-
ever, the more recent decisions seem to indicate that the courts are not willing to
venture that far. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 108.
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The answer to this question lies ultimately in a combined reading of
the Supreme Court decisions in International Shoe,29 Hanson v. Denckla,30
and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.31 The one basic principle which
underlies the Court's decision in International Shoe is that a state may
exercise in personam jurisdiction whenever an individual's3 2 relationship
to the state is such as to make the exercise of that jurisdiction reasonable.33
In McGee, the Court expanded the concept of reasonableness to include
a California court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over an insurance
company whose sole contact with California was the mailing of one policy
into the state.3 4 However, in Hanson the Court felt constrained to em-
phasize that all restrictions on jurisdiction had not been abrogated by
holding that, as a result of the inherent "territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States,"33 due process requires, at the minimum,
that a state not exercise in personam jurisdiction unless there is "some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."' 36 These cases taken together indicate that
there are three requirements which must be met before a state's exercise
of in personam jurisdiction will satisfy due process standards.3 The first
of these requirements dictates that there be some act or transaction con-
summated by the defendant within the forum state.3 8 The defendant need
not be physically within the state, but may consummate the transaction
by mail or other means.3 9 The mere inclusion of a valid choice of law
clause in a contract would not appear to satisfy this first requirement,
29. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
32. International Shoe was concerned with in personam jurisdiction over cor-
porations, but the approach of the Court is equally applicable to in personam juris-
diction over individuals. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647(4th Cir. 1961). See Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Russell, 261 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Tenn.
1966); J.W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos, 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966); Owens v.
Superior Ct., 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959) ; Compania De Astral, S.A. v.
Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943(1955) ; Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 935-36. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFLICr or LAWS § 24 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II, 1967) with RESTATE-
M4NT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II, 1967).
33. RESTATEMENTr (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 & comment b at 133-34
(Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II, 1967). See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th
Cir. 1961).
34. See Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead - Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT.
L. Rrv. 285 (1958).
35. 357 U.S. at 251.
36. Id. at 253.
37. Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a Single Act:
A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958). Accord
Kourkene v. American BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1963) ; L.D. Reeder
Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773-75 & 773 n.12 (9th Cir. 1959).
Cf. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 646-48 (4th Cir. 1961);
Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
38. Note, supra note 37, at 352. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 222 (1957).
39. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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since it is simply the invocation of the benefits and protections of the
chosen state's laws and not an act or transaction within the state. There-
fore, some contact other than a choice of law clause, such as the mailing
of payments into the chosen state40 or the execution or negotiation of the
contract there,41 would be necessary before jurisdiction could be constitu-
tionally asserted.
The second requirement is that the cause of action arise out of, or
result from, the activities of the defendant within the forum state.4 2 Since
under the first requirement it was noted that the mere inclusion of a
choice of law clause does not constitute an act within the chosen state, it
is clear that this clause cannot be the act out of which the cause of action
arose. Therefore, again it would be necessary for there to be some contact
with the forum state other than the invocation of that state's laws as a
term in the contract in order for this second requirement to be met.
These first two rules essentially set forth the minimum contact that is
a prerequisite to a state's assertion of in personam jurisdiction.4s It is
only after such minimum contact has been established that the third
requirement, the test of reasonableness as announced in International Shoe,
comes into play.44 Since any determination of reasonableness is the product
of a balancing of interests, 45 the Court in International Shoe stated that
an "estimate of the inconveniences . . . [to the parties in having trial
away from their 'home' forum] . . . is relevant in this connection. ' 46
This has been held to embrace those factors which are weighed under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.47 It is in this respect that the choice
of law clause takes on jurisdictional importance in addition to its primary
function and effect of controlling which law will apply. In determining
the proper forum it has been held that
[f]actors of public interest . . . have a place in applying the doc-
trine. . . . There is a local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the
40. Cf. id.; G. Benedict Corp. v. Epstein, 47 Misc. 2d 316, 262 N.Y.S.2d 726
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
41. See, e.g., Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 330,
107 N.W.2d 381, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961) ; Gavenda Bros., Inc. v. Elkins
Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
42. Note, supra note 37, at 353-54. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-52
(1958); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1915); Old Wayne Mut. Life
Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22-23 (1907).
43. Note, supra note 37, at 353-54.
44. See p. 769 supra.
45. Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 924.
46. 326 U.S. at 317, quoting Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91
(2d Cir. 1948) ; Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1948) ;
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312-14 (1956).
47. See Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423 (Alaska), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 956 (1965) ; Space Chem., Inc. v. Sprayon Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 680, 50
Cal. Rptr. 746 (1966); Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219
N.E.2d 646 (1966); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264
Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962); Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid Center,
Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961) ; Ehrenzweig,
supra note 46; Note, supra note 37, at 356-57.
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trial ... in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.4
8
It thus appears that a choice of law clause would weigh heavily in favor
of the chosen state's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary defendant, since the chosen state's courts would be best qualified
to apply their own law. However, the appropriateness of having trial in
the controlling-law state is not the only factor to be taken into considera-
tion under the reasonableness test. Other factors which the Supreme
Court has enumerated are
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of com-
pulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses . . . and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may
also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained.
The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. ...
[P]laintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex,"
"harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy .... 49
With the addition of these other considerations, the importance of the
choice of law clause becomes somewhat diluted. The advantage of having
the chosen state try the case may be outweighed by the fact that any
judgment recovered by the plaintiff may not be enforceable without further
litigation in defendant's home forum, as was the situation in the instant
case. Another factor which may weigh against trial in the chosen state
when the contract has been negotiated and executed elsewhere is that by
such action the plaintiff has demonstrated that it would not be overburden-
some to sue in a foreign jurisdiction. 0 Another factor which should be
taken into account in the balancing of interests tests is the fact that the
choice of law clause may not have been freely bargained-for; if this be
the case, no weight should be given to such a clause.5 1
There is also a certain class differentiation which, though seldom
articulated, may well influence court decisions in this area.12 It has been
suggested by one commentator that when the interests of a defendant, who
48. Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
49. Id. at 508.
50. See, e.g., Knight v. District Ct., 424 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1967), where the court,
in holding that the Colorado District Court had jurisdiction over the Utah peti-
tioners, stated that "it seems to us to be eminently fair and just to require the peti-
tioners, who were able to come over the mountain to borrow $30,000, to return when
they are allegedly in default as concerns repayment .... ." Id. at 113; Reiblich,
Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over Foreign Corporations Under the Act of 1937,
3 Mo. L. Rtv. 35 (1938), wherein the author states that the scales should be tipped
in favor of due process when we consider along with the convenience to the plaintiff
the fact that the defendant corporation came to the jurisdiction to contract with
the plaintiff. Id. at 70-71.
51. See Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L.
R4v. 1072 (1953).
52. Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 936.
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is a natural person, are being weighed in the balancing of interests test,
the courts should be less constrained to find jurisdiction over such a
defendant than in the case where a defendant corporation's interests are
being weighed.53 The rationale for such differentiation is that a state is
generally without the power to exclude an individual from doing business
or making contracts in the state, but can completely exclude foreign cor-
porations or admit them subject to conditions; and since a state has this
power over corporations generally, it should require less contacts to subject
a corporation to that state's in personam jurisdiction.54
In conclusion, it would appear that the district court's holding that
the defendant alleged sufficient facts, which if proven, would defeat the
action in that if the sole contact with New York was the choice of law
proviso it would not meet the "transacting of business" provision of the
New York long-arm statute. Moreover, on the broader constitutional level,
it is submitted that even where a choice of law clause is reasonably related
to the parties or the transaction, and therefore controlling as to which law
should apply, without some other form of contact with that state, this
clause alone is not a sufficient basis on which a state may assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction. However, once a minimum contact is shown to exist,
then the choice of law clause becomes a persuasive, but not definitive, factor
in determining whether such assertion is reasonable.
Warren W. Faulk
53. Ehrenzweig, supra note 34, at 292.
54. Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 245, 107 A.2d
357, 368 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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